Beatriz Cardoso Braz
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Rotterdam Port is one of the biggest ports in Europe (Van de Laar & Hein, 2020), playing a key role in global trade. Its success is often attributed to a mix of factors: industrial growth, post-war recovery, and the economic shifts triggered by the Suez Crisis (Boon, 2014). These developments fuelled the expansion of a port that had been heavily damaged by the Nazi bombings during World War II.
But was this expansion truly a success? What defines success in this context? And to what extent can Rotterdam’s post-war growth be seen as a long-term achievement rather than merely a strategic necessity? These questions are asked and explored throughout the blog.
While the Port of Rotterdam is often considered a model for the rest of Europe, I believe its positive aspects can sometimes overshadow the negative consequences, such as environmental pollution and the destruction of villages and the surrounding areas. These consequences raise important questions about the cost of progress and whether economic development should come at the expense of ecological and social well-being.
In this blog, we take a critical look at the expansion of Rotterdam Port. Was it a well-balanced success story, or was it simply the result of pragmatic decisions with far-reaching consequences?
Historical Context
In this section I will provide the historical context of Rotterdam Port during the Nazi occupation, and it will explain under which circumstances Rotterdam Port was expanded. During World War II the Netherlands was under Nazi occupation. In 1944 heavy explosives were placed along the quays of the Port of Rotterdam, destroying approximately seven kilometres of port infrastructure within 24 to 48 hours (Posthuma, 1972). After the end of World War II, the Netherlands faced the enormous challenge of rebuilding its economy. In this context, the city of Rotterdam as well as its harbor were occupied and destroyed by the Nazi. After the Nazi liberation, the reconstruction of the port became a national priority. The municipality of Rotterdam launched an ambitious plan to rebuild and modernize the harbor, laying the groundwork for what would become one of the most significant redevelopment efforts in postwar Europe (Posthuma, 1972).
By the mid-1950s, a major economic shift was underway. The coal industry was declining, while oil was rapidly emerging as the dominant energy source. Oil consumption has become significantly cheaper than coal (Boon, 2014). According to the statistics presented in Boon’s work, in Western Europe, oil consumption dramatically increased between the 1950s and the 1970s, as oil became a cheaper alternative when compared to coal (Boon, 2014).
As a result of the Suez Crisis, the rise of maritime oil transportation led to a significant drop in transport costs. This, in turn, encouraged the use of larger vessels, pushing Rotterdam Port to expand at an even faster pace than expected to accommodate these massive ships.
To keep up with this rapid growth, Rotterdam underwent a series of major expansions, resulting in the development of three new port areas—Botlek, Europoort, and Maasvlakte 1—all within just 26 years. This transformation not only reinforced Rotterdam’s position as a global maritime hub but also highlighted the city’s ability to adapt quickly to shifting economic and logistical demands. This fast expansion was the key driver of oil companies’ financing, which aimed to invest and operate in the port areas. Their investments focused on expanding the storage capacity, expanding the loading and unloading facilities for oil tankers, and constructing infrastructure such as pipelines from Shell in the Europoort that required investments of several million guilders (Algemeen Dagblad, 1964).
De Beer Destruction, Salinisation Problems, and Rozenburg
To proceed with the port expansion, several multinational companies, such as Royal Dutch Shell, invested in the Rotterdam Harbor, driving rapid growth. Various construction works were carried out along the banks of the Maas River, which had significant consequences for the surrounding areas and nearby villages.
One of the most affected areas was De Beer, a nature reserve near Hoek van Holland that was dedicated to birdwatching and served as an important bird habitat. This area was destroyed as part of the Europoort expansion, particularly impacting the nearby regions of Rozenburg and Voorne.
Beyond the destruction of De Beer, there are reports of negative effects on the local population in Rozenburg. For instance, a former student from a local school in Rozenburg shared a testimony about the difficulties of practising physical education due to the factory developments on the Europoort bank (PortCityFutures, 2024).
Salinization problems also constrained the development of the Rotterdam Port. According to existing literature, salinization began as early as the 19th century with the construction of the Nieuwe Waterweg. However, this issue was raised and discussed during decision-making in the Botlek area. Although the salinization problem was raised and discussed during decision-making (Posthuma, 1972), the construction of the Botlek Bridge proceeded nonetheless.
Over time, the Port of Rotterdam has become one of the world’s most renowned ports, largely due to its rapid post-war expansion. Many experts attribute Rotterdam’s success to the growth of the oil industry, while others argue that the port’s expansion was primarily driven by the need for Dutch economic recovery. However, these perspectives often fail to explore the darker aspects of this rapid development: the destruction of De Beer, the environmental costs, and the dominance of the oil industry, where large corporations established themselves and financed much of the port’s growth.
Given these perspectives, I aimed to demonstrate to what extent the narrative of the Rotterdam Port expansion is not as unequivocally successful as most scholars suggest.
Budget Problems, the Lack of Financing, the Struggle to Maintain the Municipal Autonomy, and Late Regulations
Beyond the pressure on Rotterdam to expand the port for the Dutch economic recovery, archival records of meetings between the Municipality of Rotterdam and the Rotterdam Port Authority reveal a struggle to maintain the port’s autonomy while facing increasing urgency to expand rapidly to meet the demands of the growing oil industry. These records, notably from the Municipality of Rotterdam, stressed the need to avoid overreliance on public investment, instead calling for private capital to fund expansion (Nieuwe Provinciale Groninger Courant, 1958).
As a result, the emphasis on attracting private investment over relying on public funding had significant implications for the port's economic development. It enabled a faster and more flexible expansion strategy that aligned with the needs of the growing oil industry, positioning Rotterdam as a competitive global hub. At the same time, it helped oil companies take control of the financial and budget plans of the Harbor plans, and with that, the main concerns of the Rotterdam Port were the fast expansion, accompanying the pace of the oil companies, while ignoring environmental pressure groups.
From an environmental perspective, the Port of Rotterdam had ample space to proceed with its expansion without considering environmental concerns, as the first major environmental regulations only emerged after the late 1970s, following the Kyoto and Stockholm conferences. The big oil companies benefited from this delay, allowing the Port of Rotterdam to expand without facing significant environmental or legal constraints, taking full advantage of the lack of regulation.
From an economic perspective, the Port of Rotterdam stands as a prime example of a highly successful port, having been completely rebuilt after the Second World War and undergoing rapid expansion over the following two decades. However, from a historical standpoint, port success should not be measured solely through an economic lens.
From an environmental perspective, the expansion of the Port of Rotterdam had significant consequences, including environmental degradation and the abandonment of agricultural lands and local communities, with the first expansion in Botlek when thousands of farmers had to abandon their lands, without being assured that the municipality of Rotterdam would pay them to leave (Het Rotterdamsch Parool, 1949).
While the past cannot be undone, it is essential to reflect critically on these developments—often considered as successful by some.
The expansion of the Rotterdam Port is often portrayed as a symbol of national resilience and economic progress. Yet, if we look beyond economic factors, the picture becomes more complex. The destruction of ecological areas like De Beer, the forced displacement of farming communities in Botlek, and the lack of early environmental regulation raise important questions about the true costs of the so-called “success.”
This blog has explored whether port expansion driven by economic urgency can still be considered a long-term achievement. The answer will depend on how we define success. If we include social well-being and environmental sustainability in that definition, then the Rotterdam case highlights critical imbalances—and some lessons that remain relevant today.
As plans for Maasvlakte III and other global port developments emerge, Rotterdam’s story serves as both a model and a warning. Future expansion projects must strive for a more balanced approach, where economic ambition does not overshadow environmental responsibility or community welfare.
Acknowledgment
This blog post has been written in the context of discussions in the LDE PortCityFutures research community. It reflects the evolving thoughts of the author and expresses the discussions between researchers on the socio-economic, spatial and cultural questions surrounding port city relationships. This blog was edited by the PortCityFutures editorial team: Yi Kwan Chan and Wenjun Fung. In particular, we thank Carola Hein for her valuable inputs and comments.
References
Algemeen Dagblad. (1964-10-07). Shell wil gaan uitbreiden in Europoort , 5. (Delpher.nl)
Boon, M. (2014). Oil pipelines, Politics, and International Business. The Rotterdam Oil Port, Royal Dutch Shell, and the German Hinterland, 1945-1975. [Doctoral dissertation, Erasmus University of Rotterdam] Erasmus Repository)
Buijsman, E. (2013). Een kleine topografie van De Beer. Mededelingen Reeks Natuurmonument De Beer, 14. Retrieved from https://duinenenmensen.nl/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/mrndb14_topografie_van_de_beer.pdf
Dunlap, R.E., and Aaron, A. M. (2010). Organized climate change denial. In J.S. Dryzek, R.B. Norgaard & D. Schlosberg (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of climate change and society (pp. 144-160). Oxford University Press.
PortCityFutures. (2024, October). Port cities and health—Part 1: Rotterdam [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flod2qEitIA&t=1086s
Hein, C.M., & van de Laar, P.T .(2020). The Separation of Ports from Cities: The case of Rotterdam. In A. Carpenter, & R.Lozano(Eds.), European Port Cities in Transition: Strategies for Sustainability (pp. 265-286). (Strategies for Sustainability). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36 464-9_15
Geld Beschikbaar voor begin “Europoort”. (1958- 01-22). Nieuwe Provinciale Groninger Courant (Delpher.NL)
Verwezenlijking van het plan Botlek een groot nationaal belang- Gedupeerde Boeren zullen geholpen Worden.( 1949, September 24). Het Rotterdamsch Parool. (Delpher.Nl)
Posthuma, F. (1972). Het Havenbedrijf der gemeente Rotterdam 1945–1965. In A. D. Donker (Ed.), Rotterdam-Europoort 1945–1970. Uitgeversmaatschappij.